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The Formation of Financial Networks  
Summary 
Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite their various benefits, the 
linkages that exist between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this paper we 
investigate how banks decide on direct balance sheet linkages and the implications for 
contagion risk. In particular, we model a network formation process in the banking 
system. Banks form links order to reduce the risk of contagion. The network is 
formed endogenously and serves as an insurance mechanism. We show that banks 
manage to form networks that are resilient to contagion. Thus, in an equilibrium 
network, the probability of contagion is virtually 0. 
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A notable feature of the modern ￿nancial world is its high degree of interdependence. The
banking system can be easily described as a collection of banks and links between banks,
thus, essentially, as a network. The incentives for linking are driven by the bene￿ts these
links bring. For instance, banks can solve their liquidity unbalances without requiring the
intervention of a Central Bank simply by transferring funds from the ones that have a
cash surplus to those with a cash de￿cit. The supply and demand for liquidity connect
in this way the ￿nancial institutions into a network. Are the connections in the ￿nancial
world, however, limited to the ones created by market forces? There are many instances
that suggest this is not the case. The "too big to fail" phenomenon, that receives a lot of
attention in the economic literature, is one example. Linking, under the form of lending
money, is not motivated here by the intersection of supply and demand. The rational
behind bailing out a certain institution is given by the danger of contagion.
In this paper we develop a model where banks form links with each other in order
to reduce the risk of contagion. The network is formed endogenously between banks and
serves as an insurance mechanism.
Banks and other ￿nancial institutions are linked in a variety of ways. Despite their
obvious bene￿t, the linkages come at the cost that small shocks, which initially a⁄ect only
a few institutions, can propagate through the entire system. The problem of contagion can
be conveniently rephrased in terms of networks. In particular, two interesting questions are
to be addressed. On the one hand, it is worthwhile investigating what network structures
are resilient to contagion. On the other hand, perhaps more importantly is to understand
how ￿nancial institutions form these connections.
This paper addresses the second question. We investigate how banks form linkages
with each other, where a link represents a transfer of funds between two institutions.
In particular, we study a network formation process that is mainly driven by the risk of
contagion. Identifying what networks emerge in equilibrium and how resilient to contagion
these structures is of particular importance for emergent market economies. Lacking
the sound regulatory frameworks, that characterize the developed ￿nancial systems, the
banking systems of developing economies have to rely on the ways banks take decisions.
The network formation process can be interpreted as decentralizing an insurance scheme
that a central planner would adopt.
2The tools advanced by the theory of network formation helps answer this question. A
recent and rapidly growing literature on network formation games has developed in the
past few years, introducing various approaches to model network formation and proposing
several equilibrium concepts (Bala and Goyal, 2000, Bloch and Jackson, 2006, Jackson
and Wolinsky, 1996, Dutta et. al, 2005).
Despite the numerous applications of these models in the social science context, the
literature on ￿nancial networks is still very much incipient. Moreover, most of the research
done in ￿nancial networks studies network e⁄ects. Largely, they investigate how di⁄erent
network structures respond to the breakdown of a single bank in order to identify which
ones are resilient to contagion.
The theoretical literature mainly concentrates on contagious e⁄ects via direct balance
sheet interlinkages. For instance, Freixas et al. (2000) considers the case of banks that
face liquidity needs as consumers are uncertain about where they are to consume. In
their model the connections between banks are realized through interbank credit lines
that enable these institutions to hedge regional liquidity shocks. The authors analyze
di⁄erent market structures and ￿nd that a system of credit lines, while it reduces the cost
of holding liquidity, makes the banking sector prone to experience gridlocks, even when all
banks are solvent. Dasgupta (2004) also discusses how linkages between banks represented
by crossholding of deposits can be a source of contagious breakdowns. Fragility arises when
depositors, that receive a private signal about banks￿fundamentals, may wish to withdraw
their deposits if they believe that enough other depositors will do the same. A unique
equilibrium is isolated and this depends on the value of the fundamentals. Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) take a more technical approach when investigating systemic risk in a network
of ￿nancial institutions. First the authors show the existence of a clearing payment vector
that de￿nes the level of connections between banks. Next, they develop an algorithm
that allows them to evaluate the e⁄ects small shocks have on the system. Leitner (2005)
constructs a model that shows how agents may be willing to bail out other agents, in
order to prevent the collapse of the whole network. Parallel to this literature, there is a
number of theoretical papers that focus on indirect linkages. Laguno⁄ and Schreft (2001)
construct a model where agents are linked in the sense that the return on an agent￿ s
portfolio depends on the portfolio allocations of other agents. Similarly, de Vries (2005)
shows that there is dependency between banks￿portfolios, given the fat tail property of
3the underlying assets, and this caries the potential for systemic breakdown.
The empirical papers which study banking contagion paint a more optimistic message.
Recently, there has been a substantial interest in looking for evidence of contagious failures
of ￿nancial institutions resulting from the mutual claims they have on one another. Most
of these papers use balance sheet information to estimate bilateral credit relationships for
di⁄erent banking systems. Subsequently, the stability of the interbank market is tested
by simulating the breakdown of a single bank. Upper and Worms (2004) analyze the
German banking system. Sheldon and Maurer (1998) consider the Swiss system. Cocco et
al. (2003) present empirical evidence for lending relationships existent on the Portuguese
interbank market. Fur￿ne (2003) studies the interlinkages between the US banks, while
Wells (2002) looks at the UK interbank market. Boss et al. (2004) provide an empirical
analysis of the network structure of the Austrian interbank market and discuss its stability
when a node is eliminated. In the same manner, Degryse and Nguyen (2004) evaluate the
risk that a chain reaction of bank failures would occur in the Belgian interbank market.
These papers ￿nd that the banking systems demonstrate a high resilience, even to large
shocks. Simulations of the worst case scenarios show that banks representing less than
￿ve percent of total balance sheet assets would be a⁄ected by contagion on the Belgian
interbank market, while for the German system the failure of a single bank could lead to
the breakdown of up to 15% of the banking sector in terms of assets.
The paper that is closest related to ours is by Allen and Gale (2000). Allen and Gale
(2000) study how banking system responds to contagion when banks are connected under
di⁄erent network structures. The authors show that incomplete networks are more prone
to contagion than complete structures. Speci￿cally, they take the case of an incomplete
network where the failure of a bank may trigger the failure of the entire banking system.
They prove that, for the same set of parameters, if banks are connected in a complete
structure, then the system is resilient to contagious e⁄ects.
The main innovation of our paper is to endogenize the network of banks. Although, we
use the same framework to motivate interactions on the interbank market, we no longer
consider that the network of banks is ￿xed. We allow the endogenous formation of links
and analyze what are the implications for the stability of the banking system. At the base
of the link formation process lies the same intuition developed in Allen and Gale (2000):
better connected networks are more resilient to contagion. In fact, in our model there is
4a connectivity threshold above which contagion does not occur. Thus, in order to insure
against the risk of contagion, banks form links to rich this threshold. We show that banks
manage to form networks that are usually resilient to the propagation of shocks.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an illustrative example of how
a network formation process develops in a 4 - bank framework. The details of the model
are presented in Section 3, while Section 4 constructs a game theoretical structure and
introduces the payo⁄s banks have from forming links. Section 5 models the network
formation process and Section 6 analyses the e¢ ciency of banks￿link formation decisions.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Example
To illustrate what incentives banks have when forming link, we start by constructing a
simple example. We consider the banking system consists of 4 banks. Shocks in the
liquidity demand di⁄erentiate banks into two types in the following way: there will be
two banks that have a liquidity surplus +z and two banks with a liquidity shortage ￿z.
Although ex-ante banks do not have information on their type, they know how the liquidity
shocks are correlated. Thus, they can insure against these shocks simply by transferring
funds between banks of a di⁄erent type. These transfers create links between banks,
exposing the system to the risk of contagion. Explicitly, when a bank fails it induces a
loss to all the neighboring banks. If this loss is above a threshold, the banks that incur it
will go bankrupt as well. This way, the initial shock propagates to other banks via links.
We have learned that the risk of contagion depends on the size of the loss a failed bank
induces to its neighbors. The loss has two interesting properties. First, it is increasing
in the size of the deposits transferred between banks. The size of the deposits, however,
depends on the number of connections with banks of a di⁄erent type.1 Hence, the loss a
bank incurs to its neighbors decreases with the number of neighbor banks of a di⁄erent
type. Second, the loss is decreasing in the total number of links a bank has. Thus,
increasing the connectivity level in the banking system reduces its propensity to contagion.
This explains why a complete network is more resilient to the propagation of shocks than
1Only transfers between banks of a di⁄erent type play a role in balacing the liquidity surplus or shortage
of each bank. Moreover, when a bank has two neighbors of a di⁄erent type it can use both connections to











































































































a) Initial state b) Incomplete network c) Complete network
Figure 2.1: Di⁄erent states of the banking system
incomplete structures.2
We take the following initial state of the banking system simply to illustrate how these
two properties a⁄ect the banks￿ link formation decisions. Consider a banking system
connected as in ￿g. 2:1(a), and the corresponding transfers of interbank deposits marked
by arrows. We assume that the set of parameters is such that a shock in one of the banks
will propagate through contagion in the entire system. For the same parameters, however,
the complete network3 is su¢ cient to prevent contagion. We do not impose necessity,
in order to follow the link formation process gradually. We study how a social planner
would design a network in order to prevent contagion, in parallel to the decentralized link
formation process.
Social planner solution: A social planner that is able to organize transfers between
banks faces a trivial problem. Simply redirecting the links in order to move the banking
system to the network shown in ￿g. 2:1(b) reduces the size of interbank deposits by half.
If the loss associated to the new level of deposits is below the limit loss threshold, than
the failure of a bank will have no signi￿cant e⁄ects on the other banks in the system. The
social planner can achieve the objective of 0 contagion. Otherwise, the social planner can
further decrease the loss by increasing the connectivity level in the system. Adding a link
between banks 1 and 2 on the one hand, and banks 3 and 4, on the other hand increases
the number of connections each bank has and, thus, reduces the loss a bank spreads when
it fails. The parameters are assumed to insure that the complete network is resilient to
contagion. Thus, the social objective is completed again.
Banks solution: The banking system has the incentive to implement the social planner
2We show why the two properties hold in Section 3.
3All the concepts are properly de￿ned in Section 4.
6solution. To understand what drives the link formation decision of banks, one should
note that the payo⁄s from linking are heterogenous. Linking with banks of the same
type is costly, as it exposes banks to the risk of contagion without bringing any direct
bene￿ts. While links with banks of a di⁄erent type provide insurance against liquidity
shocks, links with banks of the same type serve only to reduce systemic risk by increasing
the connectivity of the system. Since the connectivity of the system depends only on the
number of links each bank has, banks will always trade a link with a bank of the same
type for a link with a bank of a di⁄erent type.
Whether the banking system will be shaped as an incomplete network, depends on
whether an incomplete network is resilient to contagion. Nonetheless, the initial state of
the system is unstable, since banks have the incentive, as reasoned above, to severe the
links with neighbors of the same type. Provided that they can coordinate, banks will move
the system to the network represented in ￿g. 2:1(b). If this pattern of connections is yet
insu¢ cient to prevent contagion, the banks can and will move the system to the complete
network. Consider, for instance, the case of banks 1 and 2 in ￿g. 2:1(b). Although there
is no link between 1 and 2, the failure of either bank will trigger the failure of the other.
The failure of bank 1 (2) will determine banks 3 and 4 to go bankrupt and this will cause
in turn bank 2 (1) to fail.4 Assuming that the loss a bank spreads can be further reduced
by increasing the number of links per bank, than both banks 1 and 2 are better o⁄ in a
network where they are directly connected. Hence, both banks 1 and 2 will agree to form
the link that will prevent them failing by contagion. Similar incentives determine bank 3
and 4 to link. The complete network is formed.
3 The Model
3.1 Consumers and Liquidity Shocks
We assume that the economy is divided into 2n regions, each populated by a continuum
of risk averse consumers. There are three time periods t = 0;1;2. Each agent has an
endowment equal to one unit of consumption good at date t = 0. Agents are uncertain
4Note that bank 2 (1) will fail independently of how many links banks 3 and 4 have. Although banks 3
and 4 might have su¢ cient links such that a single bank failure will not propagate further in the system,
when both fail simultaneously the cumulated loss will be large enough to trigger the failure of 2 (1).
7about their liquidity preferences: they are either early consumers, who value consumption
only at date 1, or they are late consumers, who value consumption only at date 2. In the
aggregate there is no uncertainty about the liquidity demand in period 1. Each region,
however, experiences di⁄erent liquidity shocks, caused by random ￿ uctuations in the frac-
tion of early consumers. Thus, although it is known with certainty that on average the
fraction of early consumers is q = (pH +pL)=2, this is realized only with a small probabil-
ity ￿. Each region, however, will face with probability (1 ￿ ￿)=2 either a high proportion
pH of agents that need to consume at date 1 or a low proportion pL of agents that value
consumption in period 1.
All the uncertainty is resolved at date 1, when the state of the world is realized and
commonly known. At date 2, the fraction of late consumers in each region will be (1 ￿ p)
where the value of p is known at date 1 as either pH or pL.
3.2 Banks, Demand Deposits and Asset Investments
We consider that in each region i there is a competitive representative bank. Agents
deposit their endowment in the regional bank. In exchange, they receive a deposit contract
that guarantees them an amount of consumption depending on the date they choose to
withdraw their deposits. In particular, the deposit contract speci￿es that if they withdraw
at date 1, they receive C1 > 1, and if they withdraw at date 2, they receive C2 > C1.
There are two possibilities to invest. First, banks can invest in a liquid asset with a
return of 1 after one period. They can also choose an illiquid asset that pays a return of
r < 1 after one period, or R > 1 after two periods. Let x and y be the per capita amounts
invested in the liquid and illiquid asset, respectively. It seems natural that banks will use
the liquid asset to pay depositors that need to withdraw in the ￿rst period and will reserve
the illiquid asset to pay the late consumers. Since the average level of liquidity demand at
date 1 is qC1, we assume that the investment in the liquid asset, x, will equal this amount,
while the investment in the illiquid asset, y, will cover (1 ￿ q)C2=R.5 This way at date 1
each bank has with probability (1 ￿ ￿)=2 either a liquidity shortage of zC1 = (pH ￿ q)C1
or a liquidity surplus of zC1 = (q ￿ pL)C1.
In addition, banks are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are not insurable. For
5Allen and Gale (2000) show in their paper that both the deposit contract and the investement in liquid
and illiquid asset are such that they maximize the expected utility of consumers.
8reasons that will become clear in due course, these idiosyncratic shocks are attached to
the state of the world ￿ S. In particular, with a small probability ￿, the failure of a bank
will occur in period 1. This implies that each bank has an individual probability of ￿=2n
of going bankrupt in period 1. This event is anticipated and the way will a⁄ect banks￿
actions will be explained later in the paper.
The shocks in the regional liquidity demand can now be expressed as shortages or
excesses in the liquidity holdings of each bank. Table 1 best describes the states of the
world for the banking system and the attached probability distribution.
Probability State/Bank 1 2 ... n n + 1 n + 2 ... 2n
(1 ￿ ￿)=2 S1 ￿z ￿z ￿z ￿z +z +z +z +z
(1 ￿ ￿)=2 S2 +z +z +z +z ￿z ￿z ￿z ￿z
￿=2n ￿ S1 fail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿=2n ￿ S2 0 fail 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿=2n ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
￿=2n ￿ S2n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 fail
Table 1: Distribution of shocks in the banking system
3.3 Balance Sheet Linkages
The regional liquidity shocks that characterize the states of the world S1 and S2 is what
motivates the banks in the ￿rst place to interact. These interactions create balance sheet
linkages between banks. In particular, the links take the form of interbank deposits that
banks exchange at date 0. As we explained above, at date 1 each bank has with probability
(1 ￿ ￿)=2 either a liquidity shortage of zC1 = (pH ￿ q)C1 or a liquidity surplus of zC1 =
(q ￿pL)C1. Since in aggregate the liquidity demand matches exactly the liquidity supply,
banks will hedge these liquidity shocks simply by transferring funds as interbank deposits
at date 0.6 This way, a contract would be closed between two banks that gives the right
to both parts to withdraw their deposit, at any of the subsequent dates. For the amounts
6An important feature of the model is that the swap of deposits occurs ex-ante, before the state of the
world is realized. Note, however, that this prevents cases when lenders have some monopoly power to arise.
For instance, in an ex-post market for deposits, lenders might take advantage of their position as liquidity
providers to extract money from banks with a shortage of liquidity. To avoid this unfavorable situation,
banks prefer to close ￿rm contracts that set the price of liquidity ex-ante.
9exchanged as deposits, each bank would receive the same return as consumers: C1, if they
withdraw after one period, and C2 if they withdraw after two periods.
Banks￿portfolios consist now of three assets: the liquid asset, the illiquid asset and
the interbank deposits. Each of these three assets can be liquidated in any of the last
2 periods. However, the costliest in terms of early liquidation is the illiquid asset. This








The states S1 and S2 di⁄erentiate the banks into two types. Banks are said to be of a
di⁄erent type if they will experience di⁄erent liquidity shocks in period 1. In particular, a
bank is of type H if it will face a high liquidity demand, that is a liquidity shortage, and
a bank is of type L if it will face a low liquidity demand, that is a liquidity surplus.
Let aij denote the amount exchanged as deposits between banks i and j at date 0. We
consider that deposit contracts are bilateral, hence we have aij = aji. Let Ni be the set of
banks i is linked to and let Ncross
i be a subset of Ni representing the banks of a di⁄erent
type i is linked to. Then, the total amount of deposits i exchanges with its neighbors
should balance out its liquidity shortage or excess. Since the insurance against liquidity





aij = z (3.2)
3.4 Losses Given Default
In the previous section we have argued that regional shocks in the liquidity demand and
liquidity supply create incentives for banks of a di⁄erent type to form links by exchanging
deposits. In this section we turn to analyze the e⁄ects of the idiosyncratic shocks that
occur in states ￿ S1;:::; ￿ S2n.
The non insurable idiosyncratic shocks, bare the risk of contagion. That is, the shock
that a⁄ects initially only one institution can propagate in the entire system. To understand
why this is the case, recall that these shocks take the form of an exogenous failure of a
bank in period 1. If this event realizes, then it might spill over ￿rst, to any bank linked to
10the failed bank and next, via links, to all the other banks. In order to evaluate contagion
risk we need to introduce a measure that quanti￿es it. The risk of contagion is evaluated
in terms of loss given default (henceforth LGD). LGD expresses the excess of nominal
liabilities over the value of the assets of the failed bank. In our setting, LGD will be
given by the loss of value a bank incurs on its deposits when one of its neighbor banks is
liquidated.
To calculate LGD we need to determine the value of the assets of the failed bank.
If a bank i fails, its portfolio of assets is liquidated at the current value and distributed
equally among creditors. Now, recall that a bank portfolio consists of three assets. First,
banks hold an amount of x per capita invested in a liquid asset that pays a return of
1. Second, banks have invested an amount y per capita in an illiquid asset that pays a
return of r < 1 if liquidated in the ￿rst period. And lastly, there are interbank deposits
summing up to
P
k2Ni aik that pay a return of C1 per unit of deposit. On the liability
side, a bank will have to pay its depositors, normalized to 1 and at the same time to repay
its interbank creditors that also add up to
P
k2Ni aik. This yields a new return per unit






k2Ni aik < C1.7 The LGD of bank j
given that bank i has failed is easy now to express as8:
LGDji = aji(C1 ￿ ￿ Ci) = aji





LGD has two interesting properties that have important implications on the way banks
form links.
￿ First, LGDji is increasing in amount of deposits aji exchanged between banks. This
gives banks an incentive to exchange the minimum amount of deposits.
￿ Second, LGDji is decreasing in (
P
k2Ni￿fjg aik). This implies that the more con-
nected one bank is, the smaller the loss it induces to its neighbors in case it fails. In
other words, the more connected one bank￿ s neighbors are, the better the respective
bank is.
7Eq. (3.1) ensures that the inequality holds.






In the previous section we have introduced losses given default and implied that the failure
of a bank might spill over to other banks via links. In this section we explain how this
spill over e⁄ect realizes.
Recall that the failure of a banks characterizes the state of the world ￿ S1;:::; ￿ S2n. When
this event realizes, any neighbor bank of the failed bank incurs a loss in the value of the
deposits exchanged with the bank that is liquidated (LGD). A closer look at the balance
sheet of a bank that incurs a loss, shows that the value of the liquid asset qC1 is reduced
by the size of LGD. Thus, in order to meet its obligations towards early consumers,
which rise to qC1, a bank needs to compensate the di⁄erence by liquidating part of the
illiquid asset. More precisely, the amount it liquidates from the illiquid asset should match
the LGD value. Liquidating the illiquid asset prematurely, however, involves a penalty
rate r < 1 and has negative consequences for the late consumers. In fact, if too much of
the illiquid asset is liquidated, the consumption of late consumers may be reduced to a
level below C1. In this case, the late consumers might gain more by imitating the early
consumers and withdrawing their investment from the bank at date 1. This will induce a
run on the bank and, subsequently, it will trigger the failure of the bank.
We can determine the maximum amount of the illiquid asset that can be liquidated









The maximum amount of illiquid asset that can be liquidated without causing a run
on the bank can be interpreted as a limit loss. Thus, any bank that incurs a LGD higher
than b(q) will inevitably fail. A value of LGD below the threshold b(q) will not trigger
the failure of a bank. It will, however, be costly for the late consumers, given that their
consumption is now reduced to ~ C2 < C2.9
9The consumption of late consumers at least equals the consumption of the early consumers: ~ C2 ￿ C1.
124 The Game
4.1 Concepts and Notations
Let N = f1;2;:::;2ng denote the set of banks. A network g on the set N is a collection
of gij pairs, with the interpretation that i and j are linked. Thus, if i and j are linked in
the network g, then gij 2 g.
The set of neighbors of bank i in the network g is Ni(g) = fj 2 N j gij 2 gg. Let
￿i(g) = jNi(g)j, where j￿j represents the cardinality of a ￿nite set. The number of neighbors
bank i has in the network g is called the degree of bank i. In addition, let Ninner
i (g) =




￿ ￿. The number
of neighbor banks of the same type is de￿ned as the inner degree of bank i. An equivalent
notation exists for banks of a di⁄erent type Ncross
i (g) = Ni(g)rNinner
i (g) and the number







We use the notation g +gij to denote the new graph obtained from g by linking i and
j, if gij = 2 g. Similarly, we consider that g ￿ gij represents the graph obtained from g by
deleting an existent link between i and j, when gij 2 g
A network g is connected if there exists a path between any two nodes i and j from N.
A path of length k between i and j is a sequence of distinct agents (i;j1;:::;jk￿1;j) such
that gij1, gj1j2,..., gjk￿1j 2 g. A network g is complete if for any node i 2 N, ￿i(g) = n￿1.
A network g is regular of degree k if for any node i 2 N, ￿i(g) = k.
4.2 Strategies, Objectives and Welfare
The interaction between banks on the interbank market can be modeled as a network
formation game, where banks are the nodes and the deposits they exchange are the links.
The network is formed as a result of banks￿actions, who decide how to form links. Since
the deposits are exchanged on bilateral basis (i.e. bank i agrees to pass its deposits to bank
j if and only if bank j will pass its deposits to bank i in turn), the network is undirected
and the formation of a link requires the consent of both parties involved. However, the
severance of a link can be done unilaterally.
The strategy of bank i can be described as a linking vector si = (si1;si2;:::;si2n) such
that sij 2 f0;1g for each j 2 N rfig and sii = 0, where sij = 1 means that i intends to
13form a link with bank j. A link between i and j is formed if and only if sij = sji = 1.10
Recall that shocks in the liquidity demand di⁄erentiate banks into two types. It becomes
apparent banks follow di⁄erent strategies when linking with banks of a di⁄erent type than
when linking with banks of the same type. In this paper we model explicitly the network
formation between banks of the same type for a given pattern of interactions between
banks of a di⁄erent type. In particular we assume that banks of a di⁄erent type form
a complete bipartite graph. Thus, for any bank i 2 f1;2;:::;ng the linking vector can
be written as si = (si1;si2;:::;sin;1;1;:::;1), while for any bank j 2 fn + 1;:::;2ng the
linking vector is represented by sj = (1;1;:::;1;sjn+1;:::;sj2n). Given this, we model the
interactions between banks of the same type and, furthermore, we study if the bipartite
complete graph can always be supported in the equilibrium.
The factor that mainly drives banks when forming links is to insure against the regional
liquidity shocks that a⁄ect the system when the states S1 and S2 realize. Banks can hedge
their potential liquidity excess or shortage by linking (i.e. exchanging deposits) with banks
of a di⁄erent type. Thus, any linking pattern between banks of a di⁄erent type is su¢ cient
for insurance purposes, as long as it allows banks to exchange deposits which satisfy the
feasibility constrain (3.2). However, links between banks expose them to contagion risk.
The risk of contagion, measured in terms of LGD, can be reduced on the one hand by
decreasing the size of deposits exchanged or, on the other hand, by increasing the degree
of each bank. If we look only at symmetric solutions, the amount of deposits exchanged
is minimal when each bank is linked to all the other banks of a di⁄erent type. This is the
rational behind the assumption that banks of a di⁄erent type form a complete bipartite
graph. In this paper we model how banks endogenously reduce contagion risk by increasing
the degree of each node in the network.
Proposition 1 Let ￿ be the set of all possible states of the worlds and denote with ! an
element of ￿rf￿ S1;:::; ￿ S2ng. Let NH(!) denote the set of banks of type H and NL(!) the
set of banks of type L in the state of the world !. Then the minimization problem for LGD
associated to each link has a symmetric solution when any i 2 NH(!) and i0 2 NL(!) are
connected and aii0 = z
n.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
10This condition capture that the formation of a link between two banks requires the consent of both
participants.
14The following remark extends the result from Proposition 1 to links between any two
banks.
Remark 1 For simplicity, we consider that the amount of deposits exchanged between
banks i and j of the same type is also aij = z
n.
Banks￿objective: In a network where banks can fully insure against liquidity shocks,
they need only to prevent losses through contagion. Thus, banks￿objective function is
reduced to minimize the probability of failure through contagion. Secondarily, once the
risk of failure through contagion is eliminated, banks minimize the expected loss in states
￿ S1;:::; ￿ S2n.
Social planner￿ s objective: The main concern of a social planner is the systemic risk.
In our framework, the systemic risk is given by the number of banks that fail, following a
shock in a single institution. Thus, a social planner objective function is to minimize the
number of banks that fail through contagion.
4.3 Payo⁄s￿Properties
The notion of limit loss introduced in Section 3.3 comes in handy for describing the payo⁄s
banks have from linking to other banks. We brie￿ y give the intuition of how the payo⁄s
are constructed. When a failed bank induces a value of LGD higher than the limit loss,
then all the the neighboring banks will inevitably fail in turn. By assumption, each bank
has at least n neighbors. Thus, the failure of a bank will cause the failure of at least n
banks more. Not surprisingly, this chain of failure will reverberate towards the remaining
banks, triggering, at the end, the failure of the entire system. If, however, the LGD caused
by a failed bank is below the threshold, only the neighboring banks will experience the
consequences, since the consumption of their late consumers will be reduced to ~ C2 < C2.
Any other bank will be able to pay C1 to the early consumers and C2 to the late consumers.
In expressing the payo⁄s, we use the second property of LGD. Namely, the LGD a
failed bank induces to its neighbors depends on how well connected the respective bank
is. Proposition 1 and Remark 1 show that the size of deposits exchanged between any two
banks is z=n. Hence, we can infer that the LGD induced by a failed bank depends on how
many neighbors the respective bank has.
The limit loss b(q) is identical for each bank and is independent of the number of links
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n
(4.1)
The left hand side of the inequality is exactly the LGD a bank that has (n+t) neighbors
induces and the right hand side is the LGD a bank with (n + t ￿ 1) neighbors generates.
Inequality 4.1 relates the contagious e⁄ects of a bank failure to the number of links
banks have. Thus, the failure of a bank that has (n + t ￿ 1) links or less will trigger the
failure of the entire system, through the mechanism described above. The failure of a bank
with at least (n+t) links, however, has only consequences for its neighbors by decreasing
the utility of the late consumers.
We discuss in detail the implications of a bank failure for the case t 2 (0;n) \ N.
Consider the failure of a bank j in a network g. We distinguish the following cases:
1. ￿inner
j (g) < t. In this case, for any i 2 Nj(g) we have LGDij > b(q). Consequently,
any bank k 2 N will also fail.11
2. ￿inner
j (g) ￿ t. In this case, for any i 2 Nj(g) we have LGDij ￿ b(q). Thus, any
bank i 2 Nj(g) will pay the early consumers C1. The late consumers, however,
will have their consumption reduced to ~ C2 < C2. Any other non-neighboring bank
k 2 N rNj(g) will not be a⁄ected in any way and will be able to pay its consumers
C1 at date 1 and C2 at date 2.
4.4 Payo⁄s
The arguments presented above are useful in de￿ning the payo⁄ a bank i gains from
network g. When the limit loss b(q) satis￿es inequality 4.1, then the higher the number
of banks with an inner degree larger than t, the higher the bene￿ts to each bank. Linking
is nevertheless costly, thus the fewer neighbors with an inner degree larger than t a bank
has, the lower the costs for the respective bank.
Formally, we can express the payo⁄ of a bank i 2 N as a function u, increasing in
the number of nodes with an inner degree higher than t and decreasing in the number of
11With this discussion, we are able to conclude that the existence of a single bank with insu¢ cient link
may trigger the failure of the entire system.
16neighbors with an inner degree higher than t.
ui(g) = f(jTj;jNi(g) \ Tj) (4.2)
where T = fj 2 N
￿
￿ ￿￿inner
j (g) ￿ tg and j￿j represents the cardinal of a set.
In addition, if the limit loss b(q) satis￿es the inequality 4.1, then for any node i and
any inner degree ￿inner
i , the payo⁄ ui has the following properties:
1. ui(g + gij) = ui(g) and ui(g ￿ gij) = ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j (g) < t ￿ 1
The explanation for this indi⁄erence relies on the fact that the failure of a node with
an inner degree below t will trigger the failure of the entire system. The failure of
j leads to the failure of i, regardless of i creating a link or severing an existent link
with j.
2. ui(g + gij) > ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j (g) = t ￿ 1
If ￿inner
j (g) = t ￿ 1 and i creates a link with j, then the inner degree of j becomes
￿inner
j (g) = t. Thus, i trades a situation when the failure of j induces its own failure,
for a situation when the failure of j results in merely a lower utility for i￿ s late
consumers.
3. ui(g + gij) < ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j (g) ￿ t
When j has already an inner degree su¢ ciently high, its failure will have only e⁄ects
for the neighbor banks. Linking with j does not bring i any bene￿ts, but it comes
at the cost represented by the loss i might incur if j fails.
4. ui(g ￿ gij) > ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j (g) ￿ t + 1
Severing an existent link with j, will leave j with an inner degree still su¢ ciently
high. It will, however, spare i from experiencing a loss in case j fails.
5 Network Formation
The main goal of this paper is to understand what networks are more likely to arise in a
banking system where ￿nancial players￿incentives to form links are shaped by the e⁄ects
of two types of shocks. On the one hand, the need for insurance against regional liquidity
shocks determines the formation of links between banks that have negatively correlated
17shocks. For this case, however, we assume that the pattern of interactions that permits
the proper transfer of funds takes the form of a bipartite complete graph. On the other
hand, the same links that allow banks to hedge the liquidity shocks expose them to the
risk of contagion. Nevertheless, we have showed that the risk of contagion may be reduced
by increasing the number of links each bank has. We will focus thus on developing a model
of endogenous link formation between banks driven by the risk of failure by contagion.
In order to identify what networks are stable, we introduce the following concept of
equilibrium due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Criterion 1 Let gij = min(sij;sji) and consider that gij 2 g when gij = 1. A network g
is pairwise stable if
1. for all gij 2 g, ui(g) ￿ ui(g ￿ gij) and uj(g) ￿ uj(g ￿ gij) and
2. for all gij = 2 g, if ui(g) < ui(g + gij) then uj(g) > uj(g + gij).
where ui(g) is the payo⁄ of bank i in the network g.12
The ￿rst condition of the stability criterion establishes that in equilibrium there is
no bank that wishes to severe a link it is involved in. At the same time, the second
condition requires that in a stable network there should not exist two unconnected banks
that would both bene￿t by forming a link between themselves. In other words, a network
is an equilibrium if there are no banks that wish to deviate neither unilaterally (by severing
existent links), nor bilaterally (by adding a link between two banks).
All the following results hold under two assumptions:
1. the limit loss b(q) satis￿es the inequality 4.1;
2. for any bank i 2 N, in the network g the crossing degree is ￿cross
i (g) = n.
The ￿rst result gives a necessary condition for a stable network to exist.
Proposition 2 Let g be a pairwise stable network. Then any bank i 2 N must have an
inner degree ￿inner
i (g) ￿ t.
12We use the standard notations: g￿ij denotes the graph obtained by deleting link ij from the existing
graph g, while g + ij is the graph obtained by adding the link ij to the graph g.
18Proof. The proof follows immediately from properties 3 and 4 described in the previous
section, properties that characterize the payo⁄s a bank i gains from the network g. Suppose
that there exists a bank i such that ￿inner
i (g) > t. Than, any neighbor j 2 Ni(g) has an
incentive to severe the link that connects it with i. This way, g is no longer an equilibrium.
This result provides only a partial characterization of stable networks. In fact, under
payo⁄s that respect properties 1 ￿ 4, there exists a broad range of networks that are
pairwise stables. It is easy to check that any network for which each node i has an inner
degree ￿inner
i (g) ￿ t￿2 constitutes an equilibrium. This multiplicity of equilibria is mainly
driven by the indi⁄erence in forming or severing links expressed in property 1. In what it
follows we alter property 1 in order to restrict the set of equilibria. Namely, we consider
that banks have a slight preference to forming links with other banks. The remaining
properties are unchanged.
Formally, when the limit loss b(q) satis￿es the inequality 4.1, then for any node i and
any inner degree ￿in
i , the payo⁄ ui has the following properties:
1￿ . ui(g + gij) = ui(g) + " and ui(g ￿ gij) = ui(g) ￿ ", 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j < t ￿ 1;
1. ui(g + gij) > ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j = t ￿ 1;
2. ui(g + gij) < ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j ￿ t;
3. ui(g ￿ gij) > ui(g), 8j 2 N s.t. ￿inner
j ￿ t + 1.
The new set of payo⁄s￿properties allows us to characterize comprehensively the set of
equilibria and give prediction for the stability of the banking system.
Proposition 3 Let g be a pairwise stable network and T = fi 2 N
￿
￿￿inner
i (g) = tg. Then
jTj ￿ 2(n ￿ t).
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 has strong implications for the stability of the banking system, especially
when t is small. If t is small, proposition 3 shows that in equilibrium most of the banks have
su¢ cient links to prevent a shock in one of the institutions spreading through contagion.
For t large, however, the predictions are weaker. We need thus a re￿nement for large
values of t. The following proposition provides such a re￿nement.
19Proposition 4 Let g be a pairwise stable network and T = fi 2 N
￿ ￿￿inner
i (g) = tg. If
t ￿ n=2, then jTj ￿ n.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 establishes that in an equilibrium network, at least half the banks will
have a su¢ ciently large number of links to insure losses that are small enough. The
following two results relate these ￿ndings to implications for the stability of the system.
Corollary 1 Let g be a pairwise stable network and T = fi 2 N
￿ ￿￿inner
i (g) = tg. If
t < n=2, then the probability that the failure of a bank will spread through contagion is at
most t￿=n.
Proof. The proof follows simply from Proposition 3.
Corollary 2 Let g be a pairwise stable network and T = fi 2 N
￿
￿￿inner
i (g) = tg. If
t ￿ n=2, then the probability that the failure of a bank will spread through contagion is at
most ￿=2.
Proof. The proof follows simply from Proposition 4.
The ￿rst result implicitly insures that for high levels of the limit loss the probability
of contagion is signi￿cantly low. The intuition for this result relies on the fact that the
higher the limit loss is, the lower the number of links banks need in order prevent contagion.
Proposition 3 indicates that a lower connectivity of the banking system is easier to obtain.
A low level of the limit loss, however, requires a high connectivity in the banking system.
Hence, the increased probability of contagion.
206 E¢ ciency
When the limit loss b(q) satis￿es the inequality 4.1, the failure of a bank with at least
(n + t) links, although it has consequences for its neighbors by decreasing the utility of
the late consumers, will not propagate by contagion. Thus, there is a complete range of
e¢ cient networks a social planner can design in order to prevent contagion in the banking
system. The set of e¢ cient networks is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let g be a network such that ￿cross
i (g) = n and ￿inner
i (g) ￿ t , 8 i 2 N.
Then g is e¢ cient.
Proof. Since ￿inner
i ￿ t, 8 i 2 N then it follows immediately that ￿i ￿ n + t, 8 i 2 N.





. As the limit loss b(q) satis￿es
inequality 4.1, then LGDij ￿ b(q) for any pair of banks ij. Hence, in the network g the
failure of a bank will not trigger the failure of other banks in the system.
The con￿ ict between e¢ cient outcomes and individual incentives is a classical theme in
economics. In this model, however, the incentives are partially aligned. Indeed, the set of
equilibrium networks, described by proposition 3 and 4, includes the e¢ cient equilibrium.
It is easy to check that a network g such that ￿inner
i (g) = t, 8 i 2 N is pairwise stable
and, by proposition 5, is also e¢ cient.13
The set of equilibrium networks, nevertheless, incorporates many non-e¢ cient equilib-
ria, especially for large values of t. We show that we can restrict the set of equilibria to
the e¢ cient one if we extend the pairwise stability concept previously used, to allow for
deviations in which a pair of players each can delete one or more links and/or add a link in
a coordinated manner. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of bilateral equilibrium.
Criterion 2 Let gij = min(sij;sji) and consider that gij 2 g when gij = 1. A network g￿
is a bilateral equilibrium if:
1. There is a Nash equilibrium strategy pro￿le s￿ which yields g￿.










13The existance of such an equilibrium e¢ cient network is conditional on the existance of a t-regular
network. Lovasz (1979) discusses in detail conditiond for the existance of a t-regular network with n nodes.
21A network g can be, thus, supported in a ￿ bilateral equilibrium￿if no player or pair
of players can deviate and bene￿t from the deviation (at least one of them strictly).
This equilibrium concept allows a pair of players to deviate by creating a link between
themselves, if the link did not exist before, and, at the same time, by severing other links
they are involved in. The terminology of ￿ bilateral equilibrium￿was introduced in Goyal
and Vega-Redondo (2004). Note that any bilateral equilibrium network is also pairwise
stable.
Proposition 6 Let g be a bilateral equilibrium network. Then the probability that the
failure of a bank will spread through contagion is at most ￿=2n.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
The bilateral equilibrium concept rules out all the ine¢ cient equilibria, except for
one. For instance, a network such that ￿cross
j = n, where a single node i that has an
insu¢ cient number of link, ￿inner
i < t and ￿inner
j2N￿fig = t can be sustained in equilibrium.
In this network, although the probability of contagion is very low, ￿=2n, the failure of
bank i triggers the failure of the entire system. Thus, with probability ￿=2n there will be
(2n ￿ 1) banks that will fail due to contagious e⁄ects.
In this paper we have discussed a particular set of equilibrium networks. Namely, we
have assumed that ￿cross
i = n, 8 i 2 N and we have modeled the link formation process
that takes place between banks of the same type. In other words, we have studied the set
of equilibrium networks for which each bank is linked to all the banks of the other type.
It is important to note, however, that the set of pairwise stable networks is, by no means,
restricted the set of networks for which ￿cross
i = n, 8 i 2 N. Due to the limitations of
the pairwise stability concept, networks where there exist nodes such that the crossing
degree is smaller than n can be sustained in equilibrium. The full characterization of the
set of pairwise stable networks is possible, however not of much interest since there is no
e¢ cient equilibrium that can emerge when there exist nodes such that the crossing degree
is smaller than n, for the given set of parameters.
The bilateral equilibrium concept solves this problem and proposition 6 holds without
any prior assumption about the crossing degree of banks.
227 Conclusions
The problem of contagion within the banking system is a fairly debated issue. The main
contribution this paper brings to the existent literature is endogenizing the degree of
interdependence that exists between banks. In particular, we develop a model of network
formation for the banking system. We investigate how banks form links with each other,
when the banking system is exposed to contagion risk. The question we address is wether
banks form networks that are resilient to the propagation of small idiosyncratic shocks.
The message this paper transmits is rather optimistic. Banks respond to contagion
risk by forming links. The stable network architectures that emerge are very likely to
support systemic stability. For instance, when the probability of a shock is ￿, then the
probability that it will spread by contagion is at most ￿=2n. For large values of the limit
loss, the probability of contagion is virtually 0.
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25A Appendix
In what it follows we will prove some results advanced in the main text.
Proposition 1 Let ￿ be the set of all possible states of the worlds and denote with !
an element of ￿￿f￿ Sg. Let NH(!) denote the set of banks of type H and NL(!) the set
of banks of type L in the state of the world !. Then the solution for minimizing LGD
associated to each link is for any i 2 NH(!) and i0 2 NL(!) to be connected and, hence,
aii0 = z
n.
Proof. The optimization problem is:








aii0 = z (A.2)
First we show that LGDii0 is decreasing in aii0. For this it is useful to express LGD as
LGDii0 = aii0
C1 ￿ x ￿ ry



















aik)2 > 0 (A.4)
A positive sign for the derivative implies that LGDii0 is increasing in aii0.
The only restriction in minimizing LGDij is the feasibility constraint (3.2). According
to it, any bank i needs to insure that the amount of deposits exchanged with banks of a
di⁄erent type sums up to z.
We impose that the solution is symmetric. That is aii0 = z
￿. Since there are n banks
of a di⁄erent type and LGDii0 is increasing in the amount of deposits aij, the solution to
the minimization problem dictates that each bank creates links to all the other banks of
a di⁄erent type. Subsequently, the amount exchanged on each link is aij = z
n.
Proposition 3 Let g be a pairwise stable network and T = fi 2 N
￿ ￿￿inner
i (g) = tg.
Then jTj ￿ 2(n ￿ t).
Proof. Let ￿ be the set of all possible states of the worlds and denote with ! an element
of ￿ ￿ f￿ Sg. Let NH(!) (NL(!)) be the set of banks of type H (L) when the state !
realizes. And let TH(!) (TL(!)) be the set of banks of type H (L) that have an inner
26degree ￿inner



















￿ ￿ n ￿ t. For this we assume
the contrary in order to arrive to a contradiction.
Suppose that
￿ ￿TH(!)
￿ ￿ < n ￿ t. This implies that the set TH(!) has at most n ￿ t ￿ 1




￿ ￿ n ￿ (n ￿ t ￿ 1). In other words,
the set of banks with an inner degree ￿inner
i (g) < t has at least t+1 elements. By property
1￿and 2 above we know that in a stable network all the banks such that ￿inner
i ￿ t ￿ 1
must be directly linked with each other. Since the set of banks with this property is at
least t + 1, it must be that each bank in NH(!) ￿ TH(!) has an inner degree ￿inner
i ￿ t.
We arrived thus to a contradiction.
Proposition 4 Let g be a pairwise stable network and T = fi 2 N
￿
￿￿inner
i (g) = tg. If
t ￿ n=2, then jTj ￿ n.
Proof. The proof follows similar steps as the proof for the previous result. Adopting the
same notations, we prove only that
￿ ￿TH(!)
￿ ￿ ￿ n=2.
Let
￿ ￿TH(!)
￿ ￿ = ￿. If ￿ ￿ t, the proof is complete.
Consider the case when ￿ < t. By property 1￿and 2 above we know that in a stable
network all the banks in the set NH(!)￿TH(!) must be directly linked with each other.
This implies that the total number of links14 between banks of the same type with an
inner degree ￿inner
i < t must be (n ￿ ￿)(n ￿ ￿ ￿ 1). In addition, since ￿ < t, it must be
that each bank in TH(!) has some links with banks in NH(!) ￿ TH(!). Assuming that
all banks in TH(!) are directly linked with each other, there must be at least ￿(t￿￿ +1)
links with banks in NH(!) ￿ TH(!).
Since all the banks in NH(!)￿TH(!) have an inner degree ￿inner
i < t, the total amount
of links these banks have should not exceed (n ￿ ￿)t. Thus, the following inequality must
hold:
(n ￿ ￿)(n ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) + ￿(t ￿ ￿ + 1) < (n ￿ ￿)t
This inequality can be rewritten as
14Links here are counted twice for each node. However, we maintain the same double counting for the
rest of the proof, such that in the end it cancels out.
27(t ￿ ￿ + 1)(2￿ ￿ n) < (n ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ n)
Since t ￿ ￿ + 1 < n ￿ ￿, it must be that 2￿ ￿ n > 0 , ￿ > n=2. This concludes the
proof.
Proposition 5Let g be a bilateral equilibrium network. Then the probability that the
failure of a bank will spread through contagion is at most ￿=2n.
Proof. We show that in a bilateral equilibrium networks there exists at most one node i
such that ￿inner
i < t.
Suppose that in an equilibrium network there exist at least two nodes i and j such that
￿inner
i < t, ￿inner
j < t. In a network that there are at least two nodes with an insu¢ cient
number of links, there are two sources of contagious failure. Thus the probability a bank
associates to failing by contagion is at least 2￿=2n.
Let ~ g be such a network. Then there exist a pair ij of nodes of a di⁄erent type (i.e.
i 2 NH(!) and j 2 NL(!)) such that it pays o⁄ to severe the links they are involved
in and form the link ~ gij, if ~ gij = 2 ~ g. Formally, let ~ si and ~ sj be the strategy pro￿le bank














j; ~ s￿i￿j)) > ui(g(~ si; ~ sj; ~ s￿i￿j)) and uj(~ g(s￿
i;s￿
j; ~ s￿i￿j)) > uj(~ g(~ si; ~ sj; ~ s￿i￿j))
(A.5)
In the new network, the only link i and j have is ~ gij and thus they are exposed to
contagion stemming from one source. If ~ gij is the only link banks i and j have, thus
this link will bear the entire amount of deposits necessary to provide insurance against
liquidity shocks: z. Thus, if one of the banks fails, the other one fails by necessity, since
the loss it incurs is much above the limit loss threshold. However, the probability that
one of the two banks will fail is ￿=2n and smaller than in the network ~ g. Hence, ~ g cannot
be an equilibrium.
Since, in a bilateral equilibrium there exists at most one node i such that ￿inner
i < t,
it follows that the probability that the failure of a bank will spread through contagion is
at most ￿=2n.
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